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Abstract
We propose a model in which investors cannot costlessly process information from asset
prices. At the trading stage, investors are boundedly rational and their interpretation
of prices injects noise into the price, generating a source of endogenous noise trading.
Our setup predicts price momentum and yields excessive return volatility and excessive
trading volume. In an overall equilibrium, investors optimally choose sophistication levels
by balancing the benefit of beating the market against the cost of acquiring sophistication.
There can exist strategic complementarity in sophistication acquisition, leading to multiple
equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Data can be viewed as information only after it has been analyzed. Interpreting data is often
costly in terms of effort and other resources, which is particular true for market data given the
complexity of modern financial markets. In the existing frameworks– such as the noisy rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) model (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Hellwig, 1980; Vives,
2008) and the recent REE-disagreement hybrid models (e.g., Banerjee, 2011)– investors perfectly
comprehend the price function and thus can costlessly read into the asset price to uncover value-
relevant information. Apparently, such an argument requires a high degree of sophistication on
the part of market participants.1 What if interpreting price information is costly and investors
commit errors in the inference process? How to determine the sophistication levels of investors
in interpreting asset prices? How does investor sophistication affect market prices and trading
volume? In this paper, we propose a behavioral model to address these questions.
In our model, a continuum of investors interact with each other in two periods (t = 0 and 1).
At date 1, investors trade on private information in a financial market. As in the standard REE,
the asset price aggregates information and investors make inference from the price. However,
at the trading stage, investors are boundedly rational and do not fully understand how to read
information from prices. A fully sophisticated investor would extract the best signal possible
from the price (which is endogenously determined in equilibrium), while a less sophisticated
investor introduces noise in interpreting the price. After investors form their beliefs based on
the personalized price signals, they behave as Bayesian given their own beliefs and optimize
accordingly. Through market clearing, investors’optimal asset demands in turn endogenously
determine the equilibrium price function and hence the best price signal (i.e., the “truth” in
investors’personalized price signals).
At date 0, investors optimally choose their sophistication levels to maximize ex ante expected
1As discussed by Guesnerie (1992), this comprehension is broadly justified in two ways: the “eductive”justifi-
cation that relies on the understanding of the logic of the situation faced by economic agents and that is associated
with mental activity of agents aiming at “forecasting the forecasts of others;” and the “evolutive” justification
that emphasizes the learning possibilities offered by the repetition of the situation and that is associated with the
convergence of several versions of learning processes. See Section 7.1 in Vives (2008).
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utilities understanding that at date 1 they will be boundedly rational in reading information
from prices. On the one hand, increasing sophistication reduces the bounded rationality at
the later trading stage, which therefore benefits investors ex ante. On the other hand, acquiring
sophistication is costly. For instance, if we think of investors as individual investors, then in order
to become more sophisticated, investors may need better education/training (which will cost
wealth) or simply need to think harder (which will be involved with mental costs). The optimal
sophistication level is determined by balancing the benefit from reduced bounded rationality
against the cost of sophistication acquisition.
We first analyze the equilibrium in the date-1 financial market, which can be viewed as an
REE extended with bounded rationality. We find that costly price interpretation can inject noise
into the price system. Specifically, in our setting, the equilibrium price is a linear function of the
asset fundamental and a noise term. The fundamental term comes from aggregating investors’
private value-relevant information, which is the root reason why investors care to learn from the
price. The noise term in the price arises from a common error in investors’personalized price
signals, which is meant to capture the idea that in processing price data, investors may suffer
a common cognitive error (such as “sentiment”/“misperception”). Compared to the standard
REE, costly interpretation of prices leads to price momentum (future returns depend positively
on the current price), excessive return volatility, and excessive trading volume, which is consistent
with the existing empirical evidence (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Moskowitz, Ooi and
Pedersen (2012) on momentum; Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) on excess volatility;
and Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) on excessive trading).
After analyzing the date-1 financial market equilibrium, we return to date 0 and examine
how sophistication levels are determined in an overall equilibrium. The incentive to acquire
sophistication comes primarily from beating the average sophistication level across the market,
which allows the investor to interpret the price better and trade better (i.e., more likely to buy low
and sell high). We analyze two types of sophistication choices by investors: (1) sophistication
levels to tame the exposure to the common sentiment and (2) sophistication levels to curb
idiosyncratic errors of processing prices. We find that sentiment sophistication choice can exhibit
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strategic complementarity, leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria.
We then extend our setting to allow exogenous noise trading. In this extension, returns
can exhibit either momentum or reversal, depending on the size of the exogenous noise trading.
This is due to the interaction between two forces. First, exogenous noise trading tends to cause
returns to exhibit reversal: large noise demand pushes price too high and thus, a high price
predicts a future price decline (see Banerjee et al., 2009 and Ch. 4 in Vives, 2008). Second,
costly interpretation of prices leads to underreaction of prices to information, giving rise to
price momentum. The second effect dominates if and only if the size of noise trading is small.
Nonetheless, independent of the size of noise trading, acquiring sophistication about taming
sentiment can always lead to strategic complementarity and multiple equilibria.
We finally compare our model to four alternative existing theories that are conceptually
related to our story: supply information (Ganguli and Yang, 2009), dismissive traders (Banerjee,
2011), cursed traders (Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2019), and operation risk (Basak and Buffa,
2019). We show that supply information and operation risk deliver reversal, while dismissiveness
and cursedness can deliver price momentum. Relative to dismissiveness and cursedness, our
theory predicts different patterns on other variables such as trading volume (see next section for
details).
2 Related Literature
A recent literature explores environment complexity that makes agents fail to account for the
informational content of other players’actions in game settings. Eyster and Rabin (2005) de-
velop the concept of “cursed equilibrium,”which assumes that each player correctly predicts the
distribution of other players’actions, but underestimates the degree to which these actions are
correlated with other players’information. Esponda and Pouzo (2016) propose the concept of
“Berk-Nash equilibrium”to capture that people can have a possibly misspecified view of their
environment. Although these models are cast in a game theoretical framework, the spirit of our
financial market model is similar. In our model, investors’interactions are mediated by an asset
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price, which can be viewed a summary statistic for all the other players’actions.
Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2019) have applied the cursed equilibrium concept to a financial
market setting. In their setting, an investor is a combination of a fully rational REE investor (who
correctly reads information from the price) and a naive Walrasian investor (who totally neglects
the information in the asset price). Thus, the notion of “cursedness”in Eyster et al. (2019) is
conceptually related to the notion of “sophistication/attention”in our setting, since both notions
aim to capture the fact that investors sometimes partially ignore information contained in asset
prices.2 Our paper complements Eyster et al. (2019) in three important ways. First, their central
results refer to explaining trading volume. For example, they show that as the number of traders
diverges to infinity, the total trading volume goes to infinity in their framework. Instead, at the
trading stage, we conduct a comparative static analysis with respect to investors’sophistication
level, rather than with respect to the number of traders. This exercise allows us to compare our
setting to a fully REE benchmark. Moreover, this exercise helps to differentiate our framework
from Eyster et al. (2019) in terms of testable volume predictions. Eyster et al. (2019) predict
that trading volume always increases with cursedness (i.e., decreases with sophistication). By
contrast, volume is either increasing or hump-shaped in sophistication in our setting. Second
and more importantly, our setting has an extra stage to determine the equilibrium level of
investor sophistication, which generates novel theory results such as strategic complementarity
in sophistication acquisition.3 In contrast, Eyster et al. (2019) do not explore these issues.
Third, our analysis incorporates a common error in interpreting prices, which generates a form
of endogenous noise trading. This result leads to the complementarity result in the sophistication
acquisition stage, and again, these features are absent in Eyster et al. (2019).
Banerjee, Kaniel and Kremer (2009) and Banerjee (2011) have combined REE and disagree-
ment frameworks to allow investors to underestimate the precision of other investors’private in-
2See Section 5 of Eyster et al. (2019) for extensive evidence that people do not suffi ciently heed the information
content of others’behavior and of financial markets. Addoum and Murfin (2017) recently document that equity
market participants fail to account for information reflected in publicly posted loan prices.
3Recently, Angeletos and Sastry (2019) find a related result of strategic complementarity and multiplicity with
rational inattention: When other agents pay less attention, prices are more confusing, and one agent finds it
harder to pay attention in a setting of complexity.
4
formation (and hence labeled as “dismissiveness”models). A dismissive investor can be roughly
viewed as a combination of a fully sophisticated and a naive agent, and thus conceptually re-
lated to our investors at the trading stage. As we show in Section 7, in a dismissiveness model,
returns exhibit momentum only when investors’risk aversion is suffi ciently small. In addition,
dismissiveness and our model deliver different volume predictions: dismissive volume decreases
with sophistication, while in our setting, volume is either increasing or hump-shaped in sophis-
tication. Basak and Buffa (2019) have considered models of operation risk, where investors add
idiosyncratic noise into their optimal demand. In Section 7, we explore a setting of operation
risk extended with common noise and show that this type of models deliver return reversal.
Banerjee, Davis and Gondhi (2019) have recently proposed a framework to allow investors to
choose their beliefs and study when some empirically relevant behavioral biases such as overconfi-
dence and dismissiveness naturally arise in equilibrium. To the extent that behavioral biases are
negatively related to sophistication, this model is conceptually related to ours. Nonetheless, the
trade-offs and so mechanisms in the two models are different and complementary. In our setting,
investors would like to be fully sophisticated but infeasible because of the exogenous cost. In
contrast, in Banerjee et al. (2019), investors often optimally choose not to be fully sophisticated,
because wrong beliefs benefit investors by offering anticipated utility.
3 A Model of Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices
3.1 Setup
We consider an economy with three dates, t = 0, 1 and 2. At t = 1, two assets are traded in a
competitive market: a risk-free asset and a risky asset. The risk-free asset has a constant value
of 1 and is in unlimited supply. The risky asset is traded at an endogenous price p̃ and is in zero
supply. It pays an uncertain cash flow ṽ at date 2, where ṽ ∼ N (0, τ−1v ) with τ v > 0.
There is a continuum [0, 1] of investors who derive expected utility from their date-2 wealth.
They have constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) utility with a risk aversion coeffi cient of γ.
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Investors have fundamental information and trade on it. Specifically, prior to trading, investor i
is endowed with the following private signal about the risky asset payoff ṽ:





where τ ε > 0. We will refer to ṽ as “fundamentals.”
Each investor has two selves, self 0 and self 1, who make decisions at dates 0 and 1 respectively.
Self 0 does not observe any of the realizations in the later date-1 financial market, but at date 0
builds an understanding of how the market works. Self 0 instructs self 1 to extract fundamental
information from the price using the best signal s̃p = c0 + c1p̃, where c0 and c1 are endogenous
constants (that are implied by the equilibrium price price function). Self 1, however, is boundedly
rational and adds receiver noise to the intercept c0 of the price signal s̃p.4 Specifically, self 1 adds














where ũ ∼ N (0, 1) is a sentiment error common for all investors,5 ẽi ∼ N (0, 1) is an individual





to sentiment ũ and to individual processing error ẽi taking into account
a cost function C(τu,i, τ e,i). When these loadings are small, self 1 adds little noise in the price
interpretation and investors are sophisticated. Therefore, these loadings (inversely) measure
investors’sophistication levels in handling sentiment error and handling individual processing
error. Self 1 at date 1 chooses the investment Di in the risky asset to maximize her subjective
4Noise is only added to the intercept c0 because it is the simplest possible additive noise. Hence, we assume
that self 1 observes the correct slope c1.
5For instance, in describing the speculative trading activities in Chinese stock market, a recent Financial Times
article states: “Speculative decisions to buy or sell, on the other hand, are driven by market technicals, investment
fads. . . speculative investing tends to be driven by expected changes in the market consensus, rather than by
expected shifts in economic growth prospects.”(“Fundamentals simply do not matter in China’s stock markets,”
Financial Times, January 14, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/2362a9a0-3479-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4) These
“investment fads”or “market consensus”can be broadly interpreted as the sentiment term ũ in our setting.
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expected utility of ex post wealth
W̃i = (ṽ − p̃)Di − C(τu,i, τ e,i), (3)
where we normalize her initial wealth level to 0 and take τu,i and τ e,i as given. Self 1 is a price
taker who infers information from the price p̃, although adding noise in the inference process.6
We assume that self 0 cannot force self 1 to use a specific demand function. This intends to
capture the idea that self 1 is responsible for trading and adds processing errors to the instructions
on how to extract information from the price passed by self 0. If self 0 is able to instruct self 1 to
implement demand schedules, this treatment shares the spirit similar to “operation risk”studied
by Basak and Buffa (2019). In Section 7.4, we compare our model with operation risk and show
that these two models deliver different predictions (e.g., our model predicts price momentum,
while operation risk predicts return reversal).
3.2 Timeline and Equilibrium Concept
The timeline of our economy is as follows:
t = 0 : Self 0 of each investor chooses τu,i and τ e,i to maximize ex ante utility.
t = 1 : Self 1 is boundedly rational in reading information from the price. Self 1 of each
investor receives the private fundamental signal s̃i and the price signal s̃p,i, and submits demand
schedules. This implies that the demand schedule is D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i). Market clears at price p̃.
t = 2 : Asset payoff ṽ is realized, and investors get paid and consume.
The overall equilibrium in our model is composed of a date-1 trading equilibrium in the fi-
nancial market and a date-0 sophistication determination equilibrium. In the date-1 financial
market equilibrium, self 1 of each investor maximizes her conditional subjective expected utility
6Although throughout the entire paper we take a behavioral interpretation based on individual investors, we
can alternatively interpret the two selves of our investors as the research department (self 0) and trading desk (self
1) of an investment institution. The trading desk is responsible for trading assets and it relies on the institution’s
research department to have an understanding on how to generate information from prices. Research departments
describe the procedure on how to extract the best signal from prices in the form of research reports, but trading
desks add noise in comprehending the procedures in the reports.
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and the asset market clears for given sophistication levels τu,i and τ e,i. This equilibrium deter-
mines the price function and hence the best price signal s̃p. In the sophistication determination
stage, self 0 of each investor optimally chooses the sophistication levels τu,i and τ e,i to maximize
her ex-ante expected utility taking into account future equilibrium demands. In Section 4, we
will first consider a financial market equilibrium taking investors’sophistication levels {τu,i}i∈[0,1]
and {τ e,i}i∈[0,1] as given. In Section 5, we will then deal with the overall equilibrium and the
determination of sophistication levels.
4 Financial Market Equilibrium
At date 1, taking as given the sophistication levels τu,i and τ e,i, self 1 of each investor i chooses






The CARA-normal setting implies that investor i’s demand for the risky asset is
D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) =
E (v|s̃i, s̃p,i)− p̃
γV ar (ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i)
, (5)
where E(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i) and V ar(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i) are the conditional expectation and variance of ṽ given
information {s̃i, s̃p,i}. In (5), we have explicitly incorporated s̃p,i in the demand function to
reflect the informational role of the price (i.e., the price helps to predict ṽ) and used p̃ to capture
the substitution role of the price (i.e., a higher price directly leads to a lower demand). Here,
the dependence of D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) on the price p̃ in (5) reflects the fact that the investor knows that
purchasing one unit of the asset costs p̃, while her learning on fundamentals operates through
the private signal s̃p,i or “price interpretation.”
The financial market clears as follows:
∫ 1
0
D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) di = 0 almost surely. (6)
8
This market-clearing condition, together with demand function (5), will determine an equi-
librium price function:
p̃ = p(ṽ, ũ), (7)
where ṽ and ũ come from the aggregation of signals s̃i and s̃p,i. In equilibrium, price function
(7) will endogenously determine the informational content in the best signal s̃p.
A financial market equilibrium for given sophistication levels {τu,i}i∈[0,1] and {τ e,i}i∈[0,1] is
characterized by a price function p(ṽ, ũ) and demand function D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i), such that:
1. D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) is given by (5), which maximizes investors’conditional subjective expected
utilities given their date-1 beliefs;
2. The market clears almost surely, i.e., equation (6) holds;
3. Investors’date-1 beliefs are given by (1) and (2), where s̃p in (2) is implied by the equilib-
rium price function p(ṽ, ũ).
4.1 Equilibrium Construction
We consider a linear price function as follows:
p̃ = avṽ + auũ, (8)
where the coeffi cients av and au are endogenous. By equation (8), provided that av 6= 0 (which




= ṽ + αũ with α ≡ au
av
. (9)
Note that the first equation in (9) indicates that the best price signal s̃p is linear in p̃; that is,
s̃p = c0 + c1p̃, with coeffi cients c0 = 0 and c1 = 1/av. Conceptually, self 0 knows how to compute
the equilibrium and knows (c0, c1, α) but cannot impose a demand function on self 1. Self 1
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is boundedly rational and adds receiver noise to the best price signal. Thus, investor i cannot
































V ar(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i), (11)
V ar(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i) =




τ e,iτu,i + [τu,i + τ e,i(α
√
τu,i + 1)2](τ v + τ ε)
. (12)
Inserting these two expressions into (5), we can compute the expression of D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i), which
is in turn inserted into (6) to compute the equilibrium price as a function of ṽ and ũ. Compar-
ing coeffi cients with the conjectured price function (8), we can form a system of equations to
determine the two unknown price coeffi cients av and au.
Proposition 1 (Financial market equilibrium) Suppose that investors have the same sophisti-
cation level (i.e., τu,i = τu and τ e,i = τ e, for i ∈ [0, 1]). There exists a unique linear equilibrium
price function,
p̃ = avṽ + auũ,
where
av =




τ eτu + [τu + τ e(α
√








τ eτu + [τu + τ e(α
√
τu + 1)2](τ v + τ ε)
,










is uniquely determined by the positive real root of the following
cubic equation:
τ eτuτ εα
3 + 2τ e
√
τuτ εα
2 + (τ eτ ε + τuτ ε)α− τ e
√
τu = 0. (13)
Costly interpretation of asset prices brings an endogenous noise ũ into the price system. Even
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if investors were to get rid of the noise ũ in the price system by setting τu →∞, investors would
not still be fully sophisticated and thus they would not be able to extract the best signal from
the price if τ e <∞. In the limiting case in which both τu →∞ and τ e →∞, we have s̃p,i = s̃p,
and the noise ũ vanishes in the price function, making the economy degenerate into the full REE
setting.
Corollary 1 Suppose τu,i = τu and τ e,i = τ e, for i ∈ [0, 1]. Given (τ v, τ ε) ∈ R2++:
1. Fix τ e ∈ (0,∞), as τu →∞, then av = τe+τετe+τv+τε and au = 0;















3. As both τu →∞ and τ e →∞, the price function converges almost surely to p̃REE = ṽ and
s̃p,i = s̃p.
4.2 Price Momentum
We now present one main result of our model– price momentum– which says that the current
price p̃ positively predicts asset returns ṽ − p̃. Empirically, one can run a linear regression from
ṽ − p̃ on p̃, i.e., ṽ − p̃ = intercept + m× p̃ + error. The regression coeffi cient is m = Cov(ṽ−p̃,p̃)
V ar(p̃)
.
In the traditional noisy-REE setting with exogenous noise trading (e.g., Hellwig, 1980), returns
exhibit reversals; that is, m < 0 (see Banerjee et al., 2009). This is because exogenous noise
demand pushes the price too high and exogenous noisy supply depresses the price too low. In
contrast, in our setting with endogenous noise trading due to costly interpretation of prices,
returns exhibit momentum: m > 0. This result provides an explanation for the price momentum
documented in the data (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Moskowitz et al., 2012).
The price momentum in our model is an underreaction story. When investors are fully
sophisticated (s̃p,i = s̃p), the price fully aggregates their private information and there is no return
predictability. Formally, by Part 3 of Corollary 1, the price is a martingale (p̃REE = E(ṽ|p̃REE))
and hence the price change is not predictable (Cov(ṽ − p̃REE, p̃REE) = 0). When investors have
limited sophistication, their forecasts do not fully use the information in the price, which in turn
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causes their trading not to fully incorporate information, thereby making the price underreact to
information. Our mechanism shares similarity to Hong and Stein (1999) and Eyster et al. (2019)
who generate momentum via traders that make forecasts based on private information, but do
not fully infer the information from prices. Since these investors fail to extract information from
prices, the slow diffusion generates momentum.
Proposition 2 (Return Predictiveness) Returns exhibit price momentum:
m =
Cov (ṽ − p̃, p̃)
V ar (p̃)
> 0.
4.3 Implications of Investor Sophistication
In this subsection, we examine how investor sophistication affects asset prices and trading volume.
We assume that all investors have a common sophistication level τu,i = τu and τ e,i = τ e and
conduct comparative static analysis with respect to τu and τ e. In a full equilibrium setting, τu,i
and τ e,i will be determined endogenously, which will be explored later in Section 5.
4.3.1 Sophistication Level τu of Taming Sentiment
The parameter values in Figure 1 follow from the calibration exercise conducted by Kovalenkov
and Vives (2014). Specifically, we interpret one period as one year and let the total asset payoff
volatility match its historical value 20% of the aggregate stock market (i.e.,
√
V ar(ṽ) = 20%).
Regarding private information quality, Kovalenkov and Vives (2014) consider a range of signal-
to-noise ratio τε
τv
, from as low as one basis point to as high as 16. We assume τε
τv
= 1. We
also follow Kovalenkov and Vives (2014) and set the risk aversion coeffi cient γ at 2. Finally,
we assume that the sophistication level of curbing the individual processing error is constant at









= 0.2%). We do so deliberately to illustrate that even small errors in
interpreting price information can aggregate into a significant effect on equilibrium outcomes.
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Figure 1: Implications of τu for Asset Prices and Trading Volume


































































This figure plots price informativeness ( 1V ar(ṽ|p̃) ), return volatility (σ(ṽ − p̃)), price momentum (m), and trading
volume against the investor sophistication τu of taming the sentiment error. The parameters are set as follows:
τv = τε = 25, τe = 500 and γ = 2.
Price informativeness As standard in the literature (e.g., Vives, 2008; Peress, 2010), we use
the precision 1
V ar(ṽ|p̃) of stock payoffconditional on its price to measure “price informativeness”(or
“market effi ciency,”“informational effi ciency,”and “price effi ciency”). By equation (8), applying
Bayes’rule delivers 1
V ar(ṽ|p̃) = τ v +
1
α2
. Since τ v is an exogenous constant, price informativeness
is negatively related to α.
In the top left panel of Figure 1, we plot price informativeness 1




sophistication τu of taming the sentiment error. When τu = 0 or τ e = 0, we have α = 0 and
1
V ar(ṽ|p̃) =∞. When either of these two cases occurs, traders do not observe a price signal. Hence,
common noise u does not get incorporated into the price so that au = 0 and av = τετv+τε , which
implies that α = 0 and 1
V ar(ṽ|p̃) = ∞. Also, as a comparison, the α value in the standard REE
economy with both τu → ∞ and τ e → ∞ is zero. We observe (a) that costly interpretation of
prices injects noise into the price as long as investors are not fully sophisticated (i.e., α > 0 and
1
V ar(ṽ|p̃) < ∞ for τu ∈ (0,∞)); and (b) that price informativeness
1
V ar(ṽ|p̃) is non-monotonic in
sophistication τu. Intuitively, if τu increases from 0 to some positive value, trading injects noise
u into the price, lowering informativeness. However, if τu continues to increase further to infinity,
then the price becomes a more precise signal. This price-informativeness result has important
implications for determining the sophistication level in Section 5.
Return volatility Return volatility is measured by the standard deviation of asset returns,
σ(ṽ − p̃). In the bottom left panel of Figure 1, we plot return volatility σ(ṽ − p̃) against the
investor sophistication τu of taming the sentiment error. Return volatility in the standard REE
economy with both τu →∞ and τ e →∞ is zero. Costly interpretation of prices generates higher
return volatility than the full REE benchmark. This may help to address the volatility puzzle
(Shiller, 1981; LeRoy and Porter, 1981), which states that it is diffi cult to explain the historical
volatility of stock returns with any model in which investors are rational and discount rates are
constant. Also note that the excess return volatility is non-negligible even though investors only
make very small mistakes.
Return predictability In Proposition 2, we have shown that our model generates price mo-
mentum m > 0. In the top right panel of Figure 1, we plot m against the investor sophistication
τu of taming the sentiment error. Return predictability in the standard REE economy with both
τu →∞ and τ e →∞ is zero. We observe that, consistent with Proposition 2, m is indeed posi-
tive, indicating that there exists price momentum in our economy. In addition, m is decreasing
in τu as the information obtained from the price signal is becoming more precise.
14
Trading volume In the bottom right panel of Figure 1, we plot trading volume
∫ 1
0
|D (p; si, sp,i)| di
against τu. Trading volume in the standard REE economy with both τu → ∞ and τ e → ∞ is
zero. We see that costly price interpretation generates excess trading volume. Trading volume in
the model is positive since traders have private information and do not fully learn all the infor-
mation about fundamentals from prices. In our numerical exercise, trading volume is increasing
in τu. Intuitively, a high τu decreases the weight of the common sentiment component ũ in the
price signal, which indirectly makes the individual processing error ẽi relatively more important
in the price signal. Hence, there is an increase in disagreement and an increase in volume as a
result of an increase in τu.
Proposition 3 (Implications of τu)
(a) Price informativeness
(1) For suffi ciently small τu, as investors become more sophisticated by increasing τu, price
p̃ conveys less precise information about fundamental ṽ.
(b) Return volatility











(1) As τu →∞, the total trading volume does not vanish (i.e., limτu→∞ V olume > 0).
(2) As τu → 0, the total trading volume does not vanish (i.e., limτu→∞ V olume > 0).
4.3.2 Sophistication Level τ e of Curbing Individual Processing Error
In Figure 2, we analyze the effects of changes in τ e on asset prices and trading volume. The
parameter values in Figure 2 are the same as Figure 1 with the exception that the sophistication
level of taming sentiment is now fixed at τu = 500, which implies small sentiment-driven errors










Figure 2: Implications of τ e for Asset Prices and Trading Volume







































































This figure plots price informativeness ( 1V ar(ṽ|p̃) ), return volatility (σ(ṽ − p̃)), price momentum (m), and trading
volume against the investor sophistication τe of curbing individual processing error. The parameters are set as
follows: τv = τε = 25, τu = 500 and γ = 2.
Price informativeness In the top left panel of Figure 2, we plot price informativeness 1
V ar(ṽ|p̃)
against the investor sophistication τ e of curbing individual processing errors. As a comparison,
the α value in the standard REE economy with both τu → ∞ and τ e → ∞ is zero, and hence
1
V ar(ṽ|p̃) = τ v +
1
α2
= ∞. Price informativeness is monotonically decreasing in τ e. Intuitively, at
τ e = 0, the price is extremely noisy and investors completely disregard the price signal. Hence,




noise ũ is added to the price. At the same time, as τ e increases, the weight of sentiment ũ in the
individual price signal increases relative to the weight of the individual processing error, making
the signal more dependent on sentiment and hence the price more noisy.
Return volatility In the bottom left panel of Figure 2, we plot return volatility σ(ṽ − p̃)
against the investor sophistication τ e of curbing individual processing errors. Return volatility
in the standard REE economy is zero. Return volatility is non-monotonic in τ e. As τ e increases,
(a) traders have a more precise individual price signal, bringing the price closer to fundamentals
and reducing volatility, and (b) the weight of sentiment ũ in the individual price signal increases
relative to the weight of the individual processing error, making the signal more dependent on
sentiment and hence the price more noisy and further away from fundamentals.
Return predictability In Proposition 2, we have shown that our model generates momentum,
i.e., m > 0. In the top right panel of Figure 2, we plot m against τ e. Return predictability in
the standard REE economy is zero. We observe that m is indeed positive, indicating that there
exists price momentum in the economy. In addition, m is decreasing in τ e as the information
obtained from the price signal is becoming more precise.
Trading volume In the bottom right panel of Figure 2, we plot trading volume against τ e.
Trading volume in the standard REE economy is zero. We see that costly price interpretation
generates trading volume since prices are not fully revealing. In our numerical exercise, trading
volume is non-monotonic in τ e. Intuitively, an increase in τ e from τ e = 0 provides traders with
a price signal, which is an additional source of disagreement between investors, leading to an
increase in trading volume. However, as τ e increases even further the disagreement diminishes
and trading volume decreases as well.
Proposition 4 (Implications of τ e)
(a) Price informativeness
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(1) As investors become more sophisticated by increasing τ e, price p̃ conveys less precise
information about fundamental ṽ.
(b) Return volatility
(1) As τ e →∞, return volatility approaches




τu + 1)2(τ vα2τu + 2τ vα
√
τu + τu + τ v)
(τ v + τ ε + τu + α2τuτ v + α2τuτ ε + 2α
√










(1) As τ e →∞, the total trading volume does not vanish (i.e., limτe→∞ V olume > 0).
(2) As τ e → 0, the total trading volume does not vanish (i.e., limτe→0 V olume > 0).
5 Sophistication Level Equilibrium
5.1 Sophistication Determination
As we discussed in Section 3.1, the sophistication levels are determined by the rational self 0 of
each investor at date 0. Inserting the date-1 demand function D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) in (5) into the CARA





Note that this expectation is computed under the correct distribution, because self 0 is fully ra-
tional in contemplating the sophistication levels τu,i and τ e,i of her future self, which in turn
determine how much information the boundedly rational self 1 will read from the asset price p̃.








Definition 1 An overall equilibrium of the two-stage game is defined as follows:
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(a) Financial market equilibrium at date 1, which is characterized by a price function p(ṽ, ũ)
and demand functions D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i), such that:
(1) D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) is given by (5), which maximizes investors’conditional subjective expected
utilities given their date-1 beliefs;
(2) the market clears almost surely, i.e., equation (6) holds;
(3) investors’date-1 beliefs are given by (11) and (12), where s̃p is implied by the equilib-
rium price function p(ṽ, ũ) and where the sophistication levels (τu,i)i∈[0,1] and (τ e,i)i∈[0,1]
are determined at date 0.
(b) Sophistication level equilibrium at date 0, which is characterized by sophistication levels
(τu,i)i∈[0,1] and (τ e,i)i∈[0,1], such that (τu,i, τ e,i) solves (14), where investors’date-1 beliefs
are given by (11) and (12).
5.2 Equilibrium Characterization
Given that investors are ex ante identical, we consider a symmetric equilibrium in which all in-
vestors choose the same sophistication level. Let W (τu,i, τ e,i; τu, τ e) denote the certainty equiv-
alent of investor i’s date-0 payoff when she decides to acquire sophistication levels τu,i and τ e,i
and all the other investors acquire sophistication levels τu and τ e. That is,














[1 + γCov(ṽ − p̃, Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸]2
more informed trading
−γ2V ar(ṽ − p̃)× V ar (Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
excessive trading
− C(τu,i, τ e,i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost
, (15)
where the second equality follows from the properties of normal distributions.
In equation (15), improving the sophistication of future self 1 affects the current self 0’s
payoff in three ways. The first effect is a direct effect: acquiring sophistication incurs a cost,
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C(τu,i, τ e,i), which directly harms the investor from self 0’s perspective. The other two effects
are indirect, which work through affecting the trading in the future financial market. These two
indirect effects work in opposite directions.
First, being more sophisticated allows the future self 1 to better read information from the
asset price, which therefore makes her trading more aligned with price changes– i.e., buying low
and selling high– and therefore benefits the investor at date 0. This positive indirect effect is
captured by the term Cov(ṽ − p̃, Di). Intuitively, when τu,i > τu and τ e,i > τ e, investor i’s
forecast beats the market and thus, her trading improves her ex-ante welfare.
Second, investors engage in speculative trading in the date-1 financial market, because there
are no risk-sharing benefits in our setting. In this sense, trading is excessive, and the more an
investor’s future self trades, the more harmful it is from self 0’s perspective. Improving the
sophistication levels τu,i > τu and τ e,i > τ e allows self 1 to lower her perceived risk and thus she
will trade more aggressively, which in turn harms self 0 via the excessive trading channel. This
negative effect is captured by the term V ar (Di) in equation (15), which measures the size of self
1’s trading in the financial market.
The optimal sophistication levels τ ∗u,i and τ
∗
e,i are determined by the first-order conditions
(FOCs) of maximizingW (τu,i, τ e,i; τu, τ e). Formally, (τ ∗u,i, τ
∗











≤ 0, if τu,i = 0,
∂W (τu,i,τe,i;τu,τe)
∂τu,i







≤ 0, if τ e,i = 0,
∂W (τu,i,τe,i;τu,τe)
∂τe,i
= 0, if τ e,i > 0.
(17)






e in the FOCs. The overall
equilibrium is characterized by three variables, (τ ∗u, τ
∗
e, α
∗). These three variables are jointly
determined by a system of three conditions: (a) the cubic equation (13) characterizing the
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financial market equilibrium; (b) the FOC (16) characterizing the optimal sophistication level τ ∗u
of taming the sentiment error; and (c) the FOC (17) characterizing the optimal sophistication
level τ ∗e of curbing individual processing errors.
The complexity of the problem precludes a full analytical characterization of the equilibrium.
We therefore rely on numerical analysis. We consider a linear cost function, C(τu,i, τ e,i) =
κuτu,i + κeτ e,i, where κu and κe are positive constants.7 Our model admits multiple equilibria.
We use Figure 3 to plot the first equilibrium and Figure 4 to plot the second equilibrium. In
Panels a1—a3 of both figures, we plot the equilibrium values of (τ ∗u, τ
∗
e, α
∗) as functions of κu,
when κe is fixed at 0.0002. In Panels b1—b3 of both figures, we vary κe and fix the value of κu at
0.0015. The other parameters take the same values as in previous figures, that is, τ v = 25 and
γ = 2, except for τ ε = 1. We set a smaller τ ε because under coarse private information, there are
multiple equilibria at the sophistication determination stage. Numerically, we have only been
able to find two equilibria.
The qualitative patterns of (τ ∗u, τ
∗
e, α
∗) are similar across both figures and thus we focus on
Figure 3. Intuitively, an increase in the cost κu of taming the sentiment error leads to a decrease
in both sophistication levels τ ∗u and τ
∗
e in Panels a1—a2, and an increase in the cost κe of curbing
individual processing errors leads to a decrease in both τ ∗u and τ
∗
e in Panels b1—b2. However,
Panels a3 and b3 exhibit different patterns of of α∗. Specifically, in Panel a3, α∗ is non-monotonic
in κu, while in Panel b3, α∗ is monotonically decreasing in κe. This difference is caused by the
different behavior of τ ∗u: In Panel a1, changes in κu have a big impact on the choice of τ
∗
u, and
as we have seen in Figure 1, price informativeness is non-monotonic; by contrast, changes in κe
only causes modest variations in τ ∗u in Panel b1, and hence price informativeness is monotonic.
5.3 What Drives Equilibrium Multiplicity?
In this subsection, we dig deeper the driving forces of multiple equilibria by distinguishing the
choice of sophistication τu,i of taming the sentiment error from the choice of sophistication τ e,i
7We use a linear and separable cost function because it serves as a simple benchmark to understand the
numerical results.
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Figure 3: The First Overall Equilibrium


















































































This figure plots values of (τ∗u, τ
∗
e, α
∗) for the first equilibrium as functions of κu in the top panels and κe in the
bottom panels. The cost function is C(τu,i, τe,i) = κuτu,i + κeτe,i, where κu and κe are positive constants. The
parameters are set as follows: τv = 25, τε = 1 and γ = 2.
of curbing individual processing errors.
The Choice of τu We now take τ e,i = τ e as given and focus on the choice of τu,i. Since the
cost function C(τu,i, τ e,i) is exogenous, we focus on analyzing the marginal benefit and simply
set C(τu,i, τ e,i) = 0. Let us denote the marginal benefit of choosing τu,i = τu as φ (τu). The





will determine whether there is a unique equilibrium or there
are multiple equilibria. Formally, if φ (τu) is downward sloping, then the equilibrium is unique.
In contrast, when φ (τu) has an upward sloping segment, multiplicity can arise. Hence, the key
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Figure 4: The Second Overall Equilibrium










































































This figure plots values of (τ∗u, τ
∗
e, α
∗) for the second equilibrium as functions of κu in the top panels and κe in
the bottom panels. The cost function is C(τu,i, τe,i) = κuτu,i + κeτe,i, where κu and κe are positive constants.
The parameters are set as follows: τv = 25, τε = 1 and γ = 2.
We can see this non-monotonicity in Panel a of Figure 5, where we use the same parameters
as in Figure 1. Intuitively, when τu = 0 (low τu), there is no noise ũ in the price. As τu increases,
the noise ũ gets incorporated into the price and the incentives to tame sentiment increase (φ (τu)
is increasing). In contrast, for high values of τu, the price signal is already very informative and
a higher τu will not provide much additional information (φ (τu) is decreasing). Consequently,
the marginal benefit φ (τu) has a hump-shape and there are multiple equilibria.
In the following proposition, we formally analyze the potential presence of multiple equilibria
for a general cost function. Since we fix τ e,i and only consider the choice of τu,i, we denote the
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5.4 Uncorrelated Receiver Noise
This section solves the model with no common sentiment errors ũ. To this end, we assume
that τu,i = τu → ∞. Corollary 1 shows that in a symmetric equilibrium with τ e,i = τ e, price
coeffi cients are given by av = τe+τετe+τv+τε and au = 0, implying that α = 0. In this case, returns
still exhibit momentum:
m =




τ ε + τ e
> 0.
Thus, the results on return predictiveness of the model are robust to turning off the common







(τ ε + τ e).
and it is increasing in sophistication τ e. The following proposition formally analyzes the existence
of a unique equilibrium in sophistication levels when the cost function is C(τ e,i) = κeτ e,i.
Proposition 6 Suppose that τu → ∞ and C(τ e,i) = κeτ e,i. If κe is suffi ciently small, then
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with τ ∗e > 0. Otherwise, there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium with τ ∗e = 0.
This proposition suggests that complementarity and multiplicity are driven by the choice of
τu. When we get rid of the common error term ũ in the receiver noise, the complementarity
result disappears.
6 Extension with Noisy Supply
In this section, we extend the setup in Section 3.1 with exogenous noisy trading. Specifically,




, which is independent of all the other random
variables. All the other features of the setup in Section 3.1 remain unchanged. The market-
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clearing condition in the financial market now becomes
∫ 1
0
D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) di = q̃ almost surely. (18)
With noisy supply, the price of the risky asset is given by
p̃ = avṽ + auũ+ aq q̃, (19)
where a’s are endogenous coeffi cients. Hence, the price signal can be written as









where α ≡ au
av
and θ ≡ aq
av





τu,iτ q + τ e,iτ q(α
√
τu,i + 1)2 + τ e,iτu,iθ
2 sp,i
)
V (ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i), (20)
V (ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i) =
τu,iτ q + τ e,iτ q(α
√
τu,i + 1)
2 + τ e,iτu,iθ
2
τ e,iτu,iτ q + (τu,iτ q + τ e,iτ q(α
√
τu,i + 1)2 + τ e,iτu,iθ
2)(τ v + τ ε)
. (21)
The following proposition shows the financial market equilibrium and return predictiveness in
this setup with noisy supply.
Proposition 7 Suppose that investors have the same sophistication level (i.e., τu,i = τu and
τ e,i = τ e, i ∈ [0, 1]) in the economy with noisy supply. Then:
(a) There exists a unique linear equilibrium price function with coeffi cients:
av =
τ eτuτ q + τ ε(τuτ q + τ eτ q(α
√
τu + 1)
2 + τ eτuθ
2)
τ eτuτ q + (τuτ q + τ eτ q(α
√
τu + 1)2 + τ eτuθ








τ eτuτ q + (τuτ q + τ eτ q(α
√
τu + 1)2 + τ eτuθ
2)(τ v + τ ε)
,
aq = −
γ(τuτ q + τ eτ q(α
√
τu + 1)
2 + τ eτuθ
2)− τ eτuτ qθ
τ eτuτ q + (τuτ q + τ eτ q(α
√
τu + 1)2 + τ eτuθ




θ = − γ
τ ε
,



















(b) There exists a threshold τ̂ q such that returns exhibit momentum m > 0 for any τ q > τ̂ q.
Figures 6 report the results for the two main results of the paper, i.e., return predictiveness
m and complementarity in the sentiment loading τu,i. We use the same parameter values as in
Figure 1 and set τ q = 0.1 in the top panels and τ q = 5 in the bottom panels. We see that the
complementarity result in the sophistication choice prevails in both panels.
However, whether the momentum result arises depends on the size of noise trading. We can
see that the sign of m is negative when τ q is low, but it is positive when τ q is high. Intuitively,
the sign of return predictiveness is determined by two counteracting forces. First, as in the
traditional noisy-REE setting, exogenous noise trading delivers return reversals (see Banerjee et
al., 2009; Vives, 2008): exogenous noise demand pushes the current price too high and exogenous
noisy supply depresses the current price too low. Second, in our setting, investors interpret price
costly, which causes the price to underreact to information, leading to return momentum. When
the size of noise trading is high (low τ q), the first effect dominates. In contrast, when the size of
noise trading is low (high τ q), the second effect dominates.
7 Comparison to Other Related Models
In this section, we examine other models that are conceptually related to our story. We consider
four alternative theories: (a) information acquisition about noisy supply, (b) dismissive traders,
(c) cursed traders, and (d) operation risk. We will show that supply information and operation
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7.1 Information Acquisition about Noisy Supply
Information acquisition about noisy supply has been analyzed by Ganguli and Yang (2009),
Manzano and Vives (2011), and Marmora and Rytchkov (2018), among others. We base our
analysis on Ganguli and Yang (2009) and modify our setup in Section 3.1 in two aspects. First,
we shut down the sophistication level choice in our model by setting both τu →∞ and τ e →∞,
which implies that investors are able to observe the best price signal s̃p. Second, we assume













With these two modifications, the price of the risky asset is given by
p̃ = avṽ − aq q̃.
In this supply-information model, there can exist multiple linear equilibria at the trading stage.
In each of these equilibria, returns exhibit reversal (i.e., m < 0), which contrasts to our setting
of costly interpretation of prices.
Proposition 8 In the economy with supply information, if γ2 > 4τ ετ η, then there exist two
equilibria with price coeffi cients given by
av = (τ v + τ ε + τ p)
−1(τ ε + τ p),
aq = (τ v + τ ε + τ p)
−1(τ q + γ),
with τ p = β
2(τ q + τ η) and β = av/aq takes two values





γ2 − 4τ ετ η
)
,









Under SUB-equilibrium, information acquisition is a strategic substitute. Under COM-equilibrium,
information acquisition is a complement. Returns exhibit reversal under both equilibria:
m =




We incorporate dismissiveness into our model based on Banerjee (2011). We make two modi-
fications to our setup with noise trading in Section 6. First, we shut down the sophistication
level choice in our model by setting both τu →∞ and τ e →∞, which implies that investors are
able to observe the best price signal s̃p. Second, investor i’s beliefs about the private signal of
investor j are given by
s̃i,j = ρṽ +
√









ρ ∈ [0, 1] and φ̃ is independent of ṽ. The parameter ρ measures the degree of dismissiveness
by investors. When ρ < 1, each investor believes that the private signal of all other investors
includes an additional random variable φ̃. When ρ = 1, then we have a standard REE model.
With these modifications, under the beliefs of the investors, the price of the risky asset is given
by
p̃ = avρṽ + av
√
(1− ρ2)φ̃+ aq q̃. (23)
Dismissiveness can predict either momentum or reversal, depending on the value of investors’
risk aversion: When the risk aversion is suffi ciently small, returns exhibit momentum, and when
the risk aversion is suffi ciently large, returns exhibit reversal. This is intuitive because the risk
aversion scales how much noise there is in prices, and so how much noise-driven reversal there is.
Nonetheless, dismissiveness delivers different volume predictions from our model. Specifically,
trading volume increases with dismissiveness and hence decreases with sophistication (to the
extent that dismissiveness is inversely related to sophistication). By contrast, in our setting,
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trading volume either increases with sophistication or is hump-shaped in sophistication.
Proposition 9 In a setting with dismissive investors, there is a unique linear equilibrium price
function with coeffi cients:
av =
(τ vτ εα
2 − τ qτ ερ2 + τ qτ vρ+ τ qτ ε)
(α2τ 2v + τ εα




2 − τ qτ vαρ− γτ qρ2 + γτ q)
(α2τ 2v + τ εα
2τ v − τ qτ ερ2 + τ qτ v + τ qτ ε)
,
where α ≡ aq
av
= −γ/τ ε. For suffi ciently small γ, returns exhibit momentum, and for suffi ciently
large γ, returns exhibit reversal. Trading volume is increasing in dismissiveness.
7.3 Cursed Traders
We analyze cursed traders based on Eyster et al. (2019). We modify our setup in Section 3.1 in
four aspects. First, we shut down the sophistication level choice in our model by setting both
τu → ∞ and τ e → ∞, which implies that investors are able to observe the best price signal s̃p.
Second, we assume there is a finite number of traders N . Third, the risky asset pays date-2 value




is an unlearnable risk, so the private signal is only about the payoff
component ṽ. Fourth, investors’behavior lies between rationality and full cursedness. Traders
maximize the following utility
EU = E
[







where parameter χ captures the extent of cursedness. With these modifications, the price of the





This model is able to generate positive momentum as in our model. Intuitively, cursed traders
(χ > 0) disregard information from the price, which leads to price underreaction. The mechanism
is similar to our model. As explained in Section 2, our framework complements Eyster et al.
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(2019) in three important ways. First, Eyster et al. (2019) predict that trading volume always
increases with cursedness and hence decreases with sophistication. By contrast, in our setting,
volume is either increasing or hump-shaped in sophistication. Intuitively, since cursed volume
arises from investors neglecting price information, the more cursed and less sophisticated are
investors, the higher is volume. In our setting, if investors are less exposed to the sentiment error,
their posterior beliefs put relative higher weights on individual processing errors, generating more
disagreement and higher volume. This difference in sophistication-volume patterns can be taken
to the data to differentiate our model from cursedness (for instance, one can use the fraction of
institutional trading to proxy for the sophistication degree of a market).
Second and more importantly, our setting has an extra stage to determine the equilibrium level
of investor sophistication, which generates novel theory results such as strategic complementarity
in sophistication acquisition. Third, our analysis incorporates a common error in interpreting
prices, which generates a form of endogenous noise trading.8
Proposition 10 In the economy with cursed traders, the price coeffi cient is given by
av =
τ ε([N − χ(N − 1)]τ v +Nτ ε)
N(τ v + τ ε)(τ v +Nτ ε)
.
This model with cursed traders generates momentum:
m =
Cov (ṽ − p̃, p̃)
V ar (p̃)
= av
χ(N − 1)(τ v +Nτ ε)
(τ v + τ ε)(τ v +Nτ ε)
> 0.
Trading volume is increasing in cursedness χ.
7.4 Operation Risk
We incorporate operation risk into our model based on Basak and Buffa (2019). We modify our
setup with noise trading in Section 6 in two aspects. First, we shut down the sophistication level
8We have also solved our Setup in Section 3.1 with a finite number of investors N to make it more comparable
to Eyster et al. (2019). The main implications of the model are robust to a finite number of traders.
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choice in our model by setting τu → ∞ and τ e → ∞, which implies that investors are able to
observe the best price signal s̃p. Second, the asset demand contains operational errors, hence the
asset demand is given by









Di is the optimal investment strategy and x̃ + η̃i is the operational error. The operational
error x̃ is common to all investors, while operational errors η̃i are identically and independently
distributed.
With these modifications, the price of the risky asset is given by
p̃ = avṽ + axx̃+ aq q̃. (25)
Hence, the price signal can be written as
s̃p,i = ṽ + αx̃+ θq̃,
where α ≡ ax
av
and θ ≡ aq
av
. Solving for the optimal asset demand is not straightforward because
final wealth is no longer normally distributed and we cannot use mean-variance results. Final
wealth is given by
Wi = Di(ṽ − p̃) + x̃(ṽ − p̃) + η̃i(ṽ − p̃),
and we need to take expectations:
EU = E [− exp(−γWi)|s̃i, s̃p,i] .
When there is no common operational risk x̃, the optimal asset demand Di turns out to be the
exact same as the standard CARA-Normal framework:
D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) =
E(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i)− p̃
γV ar (ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i)
.
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With common operational risk x̃, the optimal demand is given by
D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) =
E(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i)− p̃
γV ar (ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i)
− E (x̃|s̃i, s̃p,i) .
Hence, the total demand is
Dor,i =
E(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i)− p̃
γV ar (ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i)
+ [x̃− E (x̃|s̃i, s̃p,i)] + η̃i.
Intuitively, since investors know that they will get a common shock x̃ to their ideal demand, then
they correct demand by their best forecast of x̃. They are able to estimate x̃ with both signals
s̃i and s̃p,i.
Proposition 11 The coeffi cients in the linear equilibrium price function are given by:
av =
[τ qτx + τ ε(α
2τ q + θ
2τx)][τ qτx + (τ v + τ ε)(α
2τ q + θ
2τx)]− αγτ qτ v(α2τ q + θ2τ)




[ατ qτx + γ(α
2τ q + θ
2τx)][τ qτx + (τ v + τ ε)(α
2τ q + θ
2τx)]− α2γτ q(τ v + τ ε)(α2τ q + θ2τx)




where θ = aq
av
, α = ax
av





ε + τ qτ vτ ε + τxτ vτ ε)α
3 + (γτ qτ v + γτxτ v + γτxτ ε)α
2 + τ qτxτ εα + γτ qτx = 0.
The common error x̃ behaves in a very similar way as noisy supply, with the only difference
that agents can learn about x̃ and as a consequence, investors try to correct for the demand shock
x̃ in their ideal demand Di. Figure 7 uses the same parameter values as Figure 6 with high τ q,
where investors are not able to observe the ideal price signal and there is noisy supply. We assume
that the precision τx of the common error x̃ is the same as the one assumed for the sentiment
term ũ. Figure 7 shows that the model with operation risk fails to generate momentum for
those values. As mentioned above, common operation risks behave in a similar way as a noisy
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supply, and thus are not able to generate momentum. We have tried a variety of parameter
values and find that the results are robust even for very large values of τ q. Panel b shows that
momentum under operation risk does not depend on the precision τ η of idiosyncratic operational
errors. Intuitively, these idiosyncratic errors disappear when aggregating demand and they have
no effect on asset prices.
Figure 7: Return Predictiveness in Settings of Operation Risk





























This figure shows price momentum (m) against the precision of the common operational risk x̃ and the precision
of the idiosyncratic operational risk η̃i. The parameters are set as follows: τv = τε = 25, τ q = 5 and γ = 2. Panel
a sets τη = 5 and Panel b sets τx = 5.
Corollary 2 In the setting with operation risk, if τx → ∞, then there is a unique linear equi-
librium price function with coeffi cients:
av =
τ εθ
2 + τ q
τ q + θ




−γθ2 + τ qθ
τ q + θ
2τ v + θ
2τ ε
,
where θ = aq
av
= −γ/τ ε. The asset price is isomorphic to a standard REE equilibrium and returns
exhibit reversal (i.e., m < 0).





independently distributed, then we end up with a standard REE equilibrium because all opera-
tional errors cancel with each other when aggregated. Return volatility and momentum will be
the same as in a standard REE equilibrium, but volume will be higher because of the operational
errors. In particular, this model of operation risk is not able to generate price momentum.
8 Conclusion
We develop a model to capture the notion that investors cannot costlessly process price data
in financial markets. Although investors actively infer information from the price, their infor-
mation processing is noisy. The more sophisticated are investors, the smaller is this processing
noise. After reading price data and form their beliefs, investors hold optimal trading positions
according to their own beliefs (and so they are only boundedly rational in extracting informa-
tion from the price). We find that imperfect price interpretation can inject noise into the price
system, which serves as a form of endogenous noise trading in our setting. Our model predicts
price momentum because investors fail to make full use of the information in asset prices. Com-
pared to the standard REE, our model generate excessive return volatility and excessive trading
volume. There can exist strategic complementarity in acquiring sophistication of taming senti-
ment, leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria. Our theory qualitatively differs from many
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Appendices (For Online Publication)
A Proof of Proposition 1
Using Bayes’rule, we can compute investors’beliefs given by equations (11) and (12). In a sym-
metric equilibrium with τu,i = τu and τ e,i = τ e, all investors have the same conditional variance
V ar(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i). Thus, inserting these two expressions into the demand (5), we can compute the
expression of D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i), which is in turn inserted into (6) to compute the equilibrium price
as a function of ṽ and ũ. Comparing coeffi cients with the conjectured price function (8), we
can form a system of equations to determine the two unknown price coeffi cients av and au in
Proposition 1. Inserting the expressions of a’s into α ≡ au
av
and simplifying yields the cubic (13)
that determines the value of α. Denote the left-hand side of (13) by f (α). That is,
f (α) ≡ τ eτuτ εα3 + 2τ e
√
τuτ εα
2 + (τ eτ ε + τuτ ε)α− τ e
√
τu.
We can compute f (0) = −τ e
√







> 0, and thus by the Intermediate Value








such that f (α) = 0. This result establishes
the existence of a financial market equilibrium. The discriminant of the cubic (13) is negative.
Thus, there exists a unique real root, which establishes the uniqueness of a financial market
equilibrium. QED.
B Proof of Corollary 1
Given (τ v, τ ε) ∈ R2++, if we take the following limits of the price coeffi cients av and au in
Proposition 1, we get:
1. Fix τ e ∈ (0,∞), as τu →∞, then av = τe+τετe+τv+τε and au = 0. Hence, α = 0.















Inserting the expressions of a’s into α ≡ au
av
and simplifying yields the following cubic
equation that determines the value of α: τuτ εα3 + 2
√
τuτ εα
2 + τ εα−
√
τu = 0.
3. As both τu →∞ and τ e →∞, then av = 1 and au = 0. Hence, the price function converges
almost surely to p̃REE = ṽ and s̃p,i = s̃p. QED.
39
C Proof of Proposition 2
Return predictiveness m is given by
m =





















4 + 2τ eτuτ ε(α
√
τu + 1)
2 + τ 2u(τ ε + τ e))
(τ eτu + τ ε(τu + τ e(α
√




where av and au are the price coeffi cients in Proposition 1. QED.
D Proof of Proposition 3
(a) Price informativeness















3τ eτuτ εα2 + 4τ e
√
τuτ εα + τ eτ ε + τuτ ε
. (26)






(1) Return volatility is given by
σ(ṽ − p̃) =
√
V ar(ṽ − p̃),
where







Using equation (27), we can calculate the limτu→∞ V ar(ṽ − p̃) = τv(τe+τv+τε)2 .












V ar[γD (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i)], (28)
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(τ e + τ ε).










E Proof of Proposition 4
(a) Price informativeness














3τ eτuτ εα2 + 4τ e
√




3τ eτuτ εα2 + 4τ e
√
τuτ εα + τ eτ ε + τuτ ε
< 0,
where the second equality arises from using (13).
(b) Return volatility
(1) Using equation (27), we can calculate
lim
τe→∞




2τu + 2τ vα
√
τu + τu + τ v)
(τ v + τ ε + τu + α2τuτ v + α2τuτ ε + 2α
√






























F Certainty Equivalent W (τu,i, τ e,i; τu, τ e) in Section 5.2



















and Cov (x, y) = σxy.
Define
x = ṽ − p̃, y = γD (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i) .
The certainty equivalent is:












− C(τu,i, τ e,i).
Very intuitive: The first covariance term (1 + σv−p,γDi)
2 is the benefit of beating the market,
and the second term σ2v−pσ
2
γDi
of variance products is the cost of excess trading. The relevant






























where av and au are the price coeffi cients in Proposition 1 and βs,i and βp,i are the coeffi cients
of the conditional expectation
E(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i) = βs,is̃i + βp,is̃p,i,
which are given by equation (11).
G Proof of Proposition 5
Let us define
Φ (τu) ≡ φ (τu) + C ′ (τu) .
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τ v − τ ε






φ (τu) = 0,













If τ v > τ ε, then limτu→0 φ (τu) > limτu→∞ φ (τu). In addition, if C
′′ (0) is suffi ciently small, then
φ′ (0) = Φ′ (0)− C ′′ (0) > 0, and thus φ′ (τu) > 0 for suffi ciently small values of τu.
H Proof of Proposition 6
Taking the first order condition with respect to τ e,i from the certainty equivalent derived above
in section F when τu →∞ and setting τ e,i = τ e, we get:




v + 2γκeτ vτ ε + 2γκeτ vτ e − τ v + 2γκeτ 2ε + 4γκeτ ετ e + 2γκeτ 2e
2γ(τ 2v + τ vτ ε + τ vτ e + τ
2







< 0, for small enough κe, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with τ e > 0
given by










Otherwise, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with τ ∗e,i = τ
∗
e = 0.
I Proof of Proposition 7
Using Bayes’ rule, we can compute investors’beliefs given by equations (20) and (21). In a
symmetric equilibrium with τu,i = τu and τ e,i = τ e, all investors have the same conditional
variance V ar(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i). Thus, inserting these two expressions into the demand (5), we can
compute the expression of D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p,i), which is in turn inserted into (18) to compute the
equilibrium price as a function of ṽ, ũ and q̃. Comparing coeffi cients with the conjectured price
function (19), we can form a system of equations to determine the three unknown price coeffi cients
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av, au and aq in Proposition 7. Inserting the expressions of a’s into α ≡ auav and simplifying yields
the cubic (22) that determines the value of α. The discriminant of the cubic (22) is negative.
Thus, there exists a unique real root, which establishes the uniqueness of a financial market
equilibrium.
Return predictiveness m is given by
m =
Cov (ṽ − p̃, p̃)
V ar (p̃)
=























The sign of m is determined by a cubic equation Q(τ q) = q3τ 3q + q2τ
2
q + q1τ q + q0. Since the
discriminant of this cubic equation is positive, there are three real solutions to Q(τ q) = 0. Also,
the limτq→∞m > 0. Hence, denoting τ̂ q as the maximum real root to Q(τ q) = 0, we can conclude
that m > 0 for any τ q > τ̂ q. QED.
J Proof of Proposition 8
See proof of Proposition 1 in Ganguli and Yang (2009) for price coeffi cients av and aq and the
properties of information acquisition. For the SUB equilibrium:
m =














= − γτ v(2γτ η + γτ q − τ q(γ
2 − 4τ ητ ε)1/2)
(2τ η)(β
4τ 3q + 2β
4τ 2qτ η + β
4τ qτ 2η + 2β
2τ 2qτ ε + τ vβ
2τ 2q + 2β
2τ qτ ητ ε + 2τ vβγτ q + τ vγ2 + τ qτ 2ε)
< 0.
For the COM equilibrium:
m =














= − γτ v(2γτ η + γτ q + τ q(γ
2 − 4τ ητ ε)1/2)
(2τ η)(β
4τ 3q + 2β
4τ 2qτ η + β
4τ qτ 2η + 2β
2τ 2qτ ε + τ vβ
2τ 2q + 2β
2τ qτ ητ ε + 2τ vβγτ q + τ vγ2 + τ qτ 2ε)
< 0.
K Proof of Proposition 9
Using Bayes’rule, we can compute investors’beliefs. Inserting the expressions for E(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i)
and V ar(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i) into the demand D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p), which has the same expression as equation (5).
This demand is in turn inserted into the market clearing condition to compute the equilibrium
price as a function of ṽ and q̃. Comparing coeffi cients with the conjectured price function (23),
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we can form a system of equations to determine the two unknown price coeffi cients av and aq
in Proposition 9. Inserting the expressions of a’s into α ≡ aq
av
and simplifying yields a cubic
equation of α. The discriminant of the cubic is negative. Thus, there exists a unique real root
given by α = −γ/τ ε, which establishes the uniqueness of a financial market equilibrium. The true
(econometrician’s) distribution of prices is given by p̃ = avṽ+aq q̃, not p̃ = avρṽ+av
√
(1− ρ2)φ̃+
aq q̃. The latter is only under the beliefs of the investors, but not under the true distribution.
Hence, return predictiveness m is given by
m =
















4 + (1− ρ2)γ2τ qτ 2ε − (1− ρ)τ vγ2τ qτ ε − (1− ρ)τ 2qτ 3ε)
(τ qτ 2ε + τ vγ
2)(τ vγ2 + (1− ρ2)τ qτ 2ε + τ qτ vρτ ε)
.
The limits of m are given by
lim
γ→0
m > 0 and lim
γ→∞
m < 0
Hence, if γ is suffi ciently small, then m > 0, but if if γ is suffi ciently large, then m < 0. Trading
volume in this model is
∫ 1
0







(γ2τ v + 2τ qτ 2ε − 2ρτ qτ 2ε + τ qτ vτ ε)
τ qτ v
.
From this equation, it immediately follows that volume is decreasing in ρ. QED
L Proof of Proposition 10
See Proof of Proposition 2 in Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2019).
M Proof of Proposition 11
Using Bayes’rule, we can compute investors’beliefs. Inserting the expressions for E(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i)
and V ar(ṽ|s̃i, s̃p,i) into the demand (24), we can compute the expression of D (p̃; s̃i, s̃p), which
is in turn inserted into the market clearing condition to compute the equilibrium price as a
function of ṽ, x̃ and q̃. Comparing coeffi cients with the conjectured price function (25), we can
form a system of equations to determine the three unknown price coeffi cients av, ax and aq in
Proposition 11. Inserting the expressions of a’s into α ≡ aq
av
, θ ≡ ax
av
and simplifying yields the
cubic equation for α and θ = −α.
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N Proof of Corollary 2
We can obtain the unknown price coeffi cients by taking the limit of the price coeffi cients derived
in Proposition 11. The asset price is isomorphic to the standard REE equilibrium and therefore,
there is no momentum m < 0. The expression for momentum is the same as in the proof of
Proposition 9 with ρ = 1. QED.
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